Andrew Devereux, Global Risk Intelligence Manager, Healix International discusses the ways in which Gen Z’s style of activism is fundamentally changing the way in which risk is assessed.
The protest events across that occurred in Indonesia, Madagascar, the Philippines, Morocco, Nepal, Tanzania, Peru, Paraguay, Timor Leste, the Maldives and Kenya among others, have been grouped together to constitute the so-called “Gen Z” protest movement as they highlight a global pattern of youth-led activism and mobilisation.
Despite the absence of shared political histories and in many instances of regional connections, each of the above-mentioned countries experienced significant youth driven protest movement in 2025 that was both rooted in public agitation and directed at governance structures perceived as unresponsive or unrepresentative.
While the triggers differed, the underlying motivation was broadly consistent and representative of a demographic seeking to be heard.
In my opinion, this is not a new phenomenon or source of insecurity.
Rather, it represents a continuation of digital era mobilisation dynamics that have been developing for over a decade.
The Arab Spring in 2011 and Black Lives Matter in 2020 were two examples of social media’s ability to facilitate rapid, cross-border information flows and unify individuals around shared narratives prior to 2025.
It would be strange to not see mobilisation take on digital means, as we have seen a trend of transitions of the public sphere into the digital sphere.
So, what distinguishes recent Gen Z led movements is not novel, but rather an acceleration in both coordination speed and cross-border resonance with anger at governance structures.
The tendency to categorise online and youth-led activism as “slacktivism” is, in my opinion, a misreading of the character and capabilities of contemporary mobilisation.
The events of 2025 make clear that digital activism is not an endpoint but is rather a preparatory phase for mobilisation or political pressure.
Political outcomes such as the resignation of Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh, the fall of Dina Boluarte’s government in Peru and the collapse of Rosen Zhelyazkov’s cabinet in Bulgaria highlight the potential of youth led, digitally coordinated protest to generate political outcomes.
Gen Z accounts for nearly 24% of the world’s population and in 2026 about 80 countries are labelled as “Gen Z-dominant”, meaning that there is a very realistic possibility that the trend of youth-led protest movements continues at least into the coming year.
In many of the countries where we saw Gen Z protests in 2025, individuals of this generation comprise a substantial proportion, if not the majority, of the country’s population.
Similarly, the global average for presidents or prime ministers since 2020 has been just above 60 years old.
This is a 30-to-45-year age gap between Gen Z protesters and the leaders who are meant to be representing them.
Therefore, as long as youth generations feel a political disconnect, youth-led mobilisation should be treated as a recurring feature of the political landscape rather than an episodic incident.
Assessing early expressions of online activism as virtue signalling, risks overlooking the very credible threat posed.
Even when digital engagement appears performative, it often represents the initial stage of a mobilisation cycle.
Social media can act as an echo chamber, where emotions are amplified and narratives are spread rapidly.
As a result, grievances can manifest as mobilisation action far more quickly than traditional crisis frameworks expect.
Youth populations possess both the organisational capability and the intent to transition from online discourse to physical mobilisation; the speed of this transition, which can be as quick as hours or days, is what turns dismissive attitudes ‘dangerous’.
This does not imply that every online movement warrants immediate concern.
It does, however, require risk managers to examine the underlying conditions seen in digital activism, rather than focusing on the tone or performativity of the engagement.
On the organisational level, this could be as simple as reconsidering the publicization of information that Gen Z protesters are liable to deem incriminatory and provocative.
A failure to do so elevates reputational, operational and security exposure and leaves institutions reacting to crises they could have anticipated.
Generations that have grown up with social media are often able to recognise mobilisation signals, as well as general signals of discontent, well before they become visible in traditional risk assessments.
Two indicators are particularly revealing – the emergence of new social forums and the adoption of shared symbolism.
At the more obvious level, spikes in newly created Discord and Telegram channels with names such as “Gen Z 212” in Morocco or “Youth Against Corruption” in Nepal, are a clear illustration of online mobilisation.
More covert methods such as popular hashtags on platforms like Tik Tok, that adopt explicit political identifiers frequently signal the online organisational phase that precedes offline mobilisation.
These platforms allow decentralised coordination at scale.
Additionally, the use of coded language or emoticons, which can seem trivial to those not fluent in digital dialogue, functions as a signalling mechanism that mobilisation is liable to occur.
Institutions unfamiliar with these discursive customs may dismiss them as insignificant, overlooking the potential implications.
The second normally features once the online organisational phase has progressed into the real-world mobilisation phase.
This is the use of shared popular images such as the Straw Hat Pirates’ Jolly Roger, which was a key feature in several of the Gen Z protests we saw in 2025.
This take on the Jolly Roger flag comes from the Japanese One Piece manga, where characters often fight for liberation from oppressors.
Evidently, this symbol is not decorative but emblematic of what Gen Z protesters deem to be a similar struggle against governance structures viewed as ‘oppressive’.
It should therefore be interpreted as the overlapping, tangible variable within cross-border and decentralised movements.
As such, symbolism like the Straw Hat Jolly Roger allows for geographically separated actors to maintain unity without formal leadership structures.
A particularly illustrative case emerged in Madagascar, where protesters combined the global protest symbolism of the Jolly Roger flag with a Malagasy satroka hat.
For participants, these symbols signal alignment over grievance and a collective identity.
For institutions and governments, however, they are frequently dismissed as aesthetic expressions rather than recognised as the framework behind decentralised mobilisation.
Decentralised mobilisation fundamentally disrupts conventional crisis management models.
Traditional state response mechanisms assume an identifiable leadership with a hierarchical structure that allows for the clear identification of negotiators.
The absence of formal leadership complicates negotiations.
Without recognised representatives or structured political affiliations, governments lack a clear channel for dialogue.
This ambiguity can prolong unrest, as the standard tools of de-escalation do not exist in the conventional means.
The decentralisation can also increase unpredictability and volatility.
The absence of a leaders means that movements are more susceptible to infiltration by actors with divergent or escalatory agendas.
This dynamic complicates attribution and the government response, as government officials are unable to distinguish the intentions of core participants from the opportunistic actors who can introduce violence.
Such accusations of infiltration were seen during Gen Z protests in Morocco and Mexico City.
Movements that are decentralised, fluid and digitalised operate in ways that standard crisis frameworks seem to be unable to manage.
Adapting these established frameworks to account for digitalisation is crucial, therefore.
The shift toward digital first mobilisation dramatically compresses the protest timeline.
Movements that once required weeks of street level organising now coalesce in hours, driven by viral content, encrypted channels and cross border narratives.
Recent Gen Z protest cycles in Bangladesh, Kenya, Madagascar, Nepal, Peru, Indonesia and Mexico all illustrate how online coordination accelerates turnout and amplifies grievances at scale.
Digital platforms lower the barrier to participation, enabling youth led uprisings to erupt with minimal warning, often before officials register early signals.
As Gen Z disengages from formal politics and invests energy in decentralised, leaderless mobilisation, the risk becomes both more unpredictable and more diffuse.
Movements no longer depend on identifiable organisers who can be negotiated with; instead, they operate through networks on Discord, Telegram and TikTok, making traditional crisis management models less effective.
Governments’ attempts to suppress these movements – such as Kenya’s tech facilitated intimidation campaigns against young activists – show how digital spaces have become primary theatres of contestation.
For organisations, the convergence of digital and physical protest raises exposure across three fronts: (1) rapid reputational risk as online campaigns escalate, (2) operational disruption from flash mob style demonstrations and (3) hybrid threats such as doxxing, deepfakes and cyber-enabled activism.
The result is a risk landscape where unrest is more frequent, less predictable and more globally contagious, mirroring the rapid cross border diffusion seen in 2025.
The most persistent blind spot is misdiagnosing digital mobilisation as noise rather than an operationally relevant risk signal.
Many senior leaders remain anchored to legacy assumptions that protests build slowly, have clear organisers and follow predictable trajectories.
In practice, Gen Z led mobilisation does the opposite: it ignites online, decentralises rapidly and spills offline without warning.
C suites often underestimate the intelligence value of emerging online indicators – new protest linked channels, coded language, shared memes or symbolic imagery – until those signals materialise as real world disruption.
A second blind spot is the overreliance on traditional crisis response models, which assume negotiable leadership structures and controllable escalation dynamics.
Analysts repeatedly note that movements powered by younger cohorts are fluid, fast and less amenable to de escalation strategies that depend on identifying leaders.
Finally, many executives lack currency with emerging activism related threat vectors. particularly hybrid digital-physical risks such as coordinated online harassment, disinformation bursts or threats directed personally at senior leaders.
Surveys of corporate security leaders show that activism and civil unrest are now rated among the most critical threats, yet executive protection and organisational preparedness often lag behind this new reality.
Treat Gen Z driven mobilisation as a structural, not cyclical, feature of your risk environment.
This generation is globally connected, digitally fluent and politically disillusioned.
Conditions that consistently translate into fast moving, decentralised protest movements capable of toppling governments, disrupting national economies and reshaping policy landscapes.
Youth led uprisings across 2024-2025 in Bangladesh, Nepal, Madagascar, Morocco, Kenya and Peru demonstrate that these movements are neither short-term nor geographically isolated; they are part of a long term shift in how political pressure is organised.
Boards should understand that digital mobilisation is not “slacktivism”.
It is a preparatory phase for real world collective action.
Organisations that fail to monitor online signals, anticipate flashpoints or adapt their crisis frameworks to decentralised activism will find themselves reacting to crises they could have foreseen.
Equally, leaders should recognise that their own visibility – pressured by social expectations to take public positions – places them squarely inside the protest ecosystem, not outside it.
The convergence of activism and executive risk is now a defining condition of modern governance.
Andrew Devereux is a Global Risk Intelligence Manager at Healix International.
He has worked at Healix for more than nine years, progressing through analyst roles focused on terrorism, regional security and special risks and is a regular contributor to the company’s flagship Healix Risk Radar reports.
In this role, he provides insight into emerging global threats, shifting geopolitical dynamics and how organisations can anticipate and mitigate risk.
He regularly offers expert commentary for podcasts, articles and journals.
Healix International provides risk management and healthcare services to clients who want control over their health, travel and risk provision.
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