Rory McGoldrick, Managing Director of SAFECROWDS GROUP explains why Hostile Vehicle Mitigation Systems (HVM) should be considered as part of a wider, holistic approach to Threat, Vulnerability and Risk Assessments (TVRA) for events, venues and public spaces.
Using vehicles as a weapon has become an increasingly common terror attack tactic, both in the UK and around the world, prompting many event organisers, venues and local authorities to deploy HVM systems, aligned to their risk profile for this type of attack.
There is a growing number of providers that offer TVRA and Vehicle Dynamics Assessments (VDA) to help local authorities, event organisers and venues to identify the level of risk and specify HVM that is appropriately rated and operationally practicable.
But TVRAs shouldn’t just outline the risk and mitigation equipment needed to protect against vehicle attacks – they should also consider the wider risk profile and a range of physical and operational measures that could reduce vulnerability to other kinds of terror attacks and security risks too.
Considering various potential scenarios is central to TVRA methodology, picture this, you’re at an event, seeing your favourite band at a stadium gig, for example, and a vehicle tries to drive into the crowd as they queue outside the venue.
The HVM system in place brings the vehicle to a controlled stop. What happens next?
It would be great if the story ended there and some risk assessments do. In truth, however, the risk of harm doesn’t stop when the vehicle does.
Protect UK lists number of terror attack methodologies, including marauding attacks (with a bladed weapon or firearm for example), improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which may be person or vehicle borne or placed and fire as a weapon, alongside vehicle attacks.
The organisation also points out that some methodologies are more likely than others, indicating that ‘a marauding attacker armed with a bladed or blunt force weapon is generally the most likely attack methodology’.
So, let’s go back to where we paused the scenario. What happens next?
The reality is that the HVM will probably only slow down the attacker, rather than prevent the attack.
They may exit the vehicle with a weapon. They may abandon the vehicle with an IED inside it. They may have been causing a distraction to enable an IED to be planted in another location.
Exploring these potential options is not about scaring anyone, it is about focusing on risk.
We can only mitigate risk, not eradicate it and the more risk factors and scenarios we consider, with a joined-up and holistic approach, the more effective the mitigation we can put in place.
Coming to terms with the fact that the terror risk is constant and serious not only adds layers of cost and operational complexity to managing venues and public spaces and organising events; it also adds a duty of care.
It’s important not to cut corners, but a multi-disciplinary approach to considering a wide range of risks and solutions can help deliver that duty of care while managing the cost and operational implications.
TVRAs shouldn’t just consider the risk of vehicle attacks and errant vehicles, they should also consider a wide range of other risk factors and security measures, including explosives detection, behavioural detection, CCTV blind spots, lighting, access routes, operational practices, staff vetting and staff training.
Recommendations for HVM protection should form part of the report, with a clear focus on matching the HVM system and location to operational requirements.
And they should ensure that any equipment recommended is appropriately rated to defend against vehicles of the predicted possible size and speed identified.
SAFECROWDS GROUP’s TVRAs for mass gatherings and major venues such as stadiums, also include the expertise of in-house crowd safety management professionals to consider flow rates and crowd safety as part of the HVM strategy.
A robust TVRA may also cover much more, addressing risk factors that may help reduce the required security and HVM spend by making operational changes or low-cost security adjustments.
There is no single blueprint for counter terrorism or security planning.
Every site, event and organisation faces a unique risk profile with many different vulnerabilities.
For this reason, it is prudent to work with a TVRA provider that is not tied to a single HVM manufacturer or solution.
Recommendations should be based on risk, not inventory or distribution agreements, with independent advice grounded in evidence, operational reality and professional judgement.
By working with a provider that offers more than HVM and has a team with wide-ranging security experience, risk profiles include hostile vehicle risk as part of a much bigger picture.
